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ALD-350

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-1634
___________
HOLY PHARAOH DR. ADMIRAL A.L.S.A.E.R. EL-BEY,
Lord Advocate of the Morehsh L.A.W.
also known as Honorable Prophet of Ahezaahnism
VS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Holy Pharaoh Dr. Admiral A.L.S.A.E.R. El-Bey,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.N.J. Civ. No. 2-15-cv-00238)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect,
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 23, 2015
Before: CHAGARES, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 13, 2015)
_________

OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM

Jason Amin-Bey,1 proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). We will summarily affirm.
Appellant Jason Amin-Bey is a detainee at a Federal Medical Center. He has a
history of filing unintelligible complaints and petitions in the district courts, and has filed
numerous such actions in the District of New Jersey since 2013. See Transfer Order,
Holy Pharoah M.M.H.R.A.A.L.S.A. El-Bey, Ed.D. v. United States, No. 2:14-cv-07407
(D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2014), ECF No. 5 (describing Appellant’s litigation history). The present
appeal concerns an action Appellant commenced in January 2015 by filing what the
District Court described as an “incomprehensible document” and, a few weeks later, an
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
The court granted Appellant IFP status and construed his filing as a civil rights
complaint. Noting that the complaint consisted of excerpts regarding statutes and
prescription medication interspersed with handwritten ramblings regarding religious
beliefs, the court stated that it “simply [could not] determine any facts that Plaintiff is

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
In his filings, Amin-Bey styles himself (in part) “Holy Pharoah Dr. Admiral
A.L.S.A.E.R. El-Bey.” For convenience, we will refer to him as “Appellant.”
1
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trying to communicate that might support a valid claim.” Accordingly, the District Court
dismissed the complaint without prejudice as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,2 and we review the District
Court’s order dismissing the complaint as frivolous for an abuse of discretion. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). If no substantial question is presented, we may
affirm on any ground supported by the record. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6;
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
The screening provisions of the IFP statute require a federal court to dismiss an
action sua sponte if, among other things, the action is frivolous or malicious. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013). A
complaint may be deemed frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is considered factually
frivolous where “the facts alleged are ‘clearly baseless,’ . . . a category encompassing
allegations that are ‘fanciful,’ . . . ‘fantastic,’ . . . and ‘delusional.’” Denton, 504 U.S. at
32-33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327-28). Accordingly, a complaint may be

2

In general, an order that dismisses a complaint without prejudice is not final and
appealable. Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
However, if a plaintiff cannot amend the complaint or chooses to stand on it, the order
becomes final and appealable. Id. at 952. Although the dismissal in this case was
without prejudice, the District Court’s conclusion that the complaint was
incomprehensible was tantamount to finding that Appellant could not cure it by
amendment. Moreover, the court did not give Appellant leave to amend or any
guidelines for doing so, as it had in prior cases. In this context, we deem the order final.
3

dismissed for factual frivolousness “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33.
We agree with the District Court that Appellant’s complaint is confused,
convoluted, and largely incomprehensible. Even construing the complaint liberally, it is
impossible to discern any factual allegations, causes of action, or claims for relief. While
we are not insensitive to Appellant’s situation, we note that he has a history of submitting
unintelligible documents to the courts despite having been informed of the requisite
pleading standards. In this case, there is simply no construction of his complaint that
satisfies those standards. We have considered Appellant’s submissions in support of his
appeal, and we likewise find them difficult to understand and irrelevant to the issue at
hand. Therefore, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing the complaint as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. In light of this disposition, we deny Appellant’s motion to
“remove and remand” this matter to the United States Supreme Court.
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